game. These can be both formal ('rule of law', externally enforced by the state) and informal ('trust', internally enforced by convention). Institutional factors are emphasized because their effects in Russian industry (and transition in general, for that matter) have been least researched so far. At the same time, they seem important, as suggested by eg the developing macroeconomics literature on (cross-country) growth empirics with institutional measures (eg Moers, 1998) . Even within one country, certainly a transition country as diverse as Russia, different enterprises may be confronted with different (quality of) institutions, influencing their operations.
Private ownership, competitive markets and hard budget constraints have of course long been regarded as the major disciplinary forces on enterprises, gaining prominent attention in the transition economics literature (eg Earle and Estrin, 1998 ).
IET's enterprise panel will be discussed in section 2. Section 3 will look at the questions on which enterprise-level response was obtained. The response itself will be described in section 4. This will pave the way for a tentative check whether or not differences in the extent of enterprise restructuring can be ascribed to the mentioned factors, particularly institutions, in section 5. Section 6 will conclude.
Panel
IET is an independent and non-profit research institute, founded in 1990 by Yegor Gaidar (hence it is also known as the 'Gaidar institute'), later the first Russian Prime Minister under President Boris Yeltsin. Its purpose is to analyze the economic and political processes taking place in Russia as a result of the economic reforms. IET tries to promote a new economic mentality in the country, and drafts economic policy recommendations. To these ends, it has also been operating a monthly business-cycle survey, since March 1992. As this paper makes use of this mail survey, this section first takes a look at its quality, in particular the representativeness of its enterprise panel.
IET's is the longest-running enterprise survey in Russia. It is conducted with European-harmonized methodology, methodological aid coming from the Confederation of British Industry, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), European Commission, and Eurostat. Results have been published in the OECD 'Short-term economic indicators: transition economies' since 1995. In September 1999
IET's panel, having been developed in the course of the monthly business-cycle surveys, consisted of 1444 industrial enterprises. In general, the response rate is 65 to 70%.
IET uses one respondent per enterprise. By mailing questionnaires to concrete persons, whose names and positions are updated regularly, it explicitly aims to establish informal terms with all respondents, and thus create a sound basis for future surveys and good co-operation. In the course of the monthly business-cycle surveys respondents have been trained to fill in the questionnaires on a regular basis. They are generally ready to provide extra information if needed. Sometimes they themselves contact IET for data or consultation. In any case, respondents always receive the (aggregate) results of the survey of the previous month (eg Tsukhlo, 1999) . Table 1 shows that this information is their main reason for responding. More generally, the dominant reasons in table 1 reveal that respondents take IET's surveys seriously. per cent a deputy CEO, and 18 per cent a Financial Department Chief. Table 2 shows the percentages of respondents in different positions by enterprise (employment) size. Source: IET
The primary source of information of IET's panel is the official register of all industrial enterprises developed by the Russian State Statistical Committee (Goskomstat). This was used in the following way. Firstly, all enterprises of each sector were extracted from the Goskomstat register and ranked according to employment. Secondly, all large enterprises of each sector were included in the panel, and only part of the rest of the enterprises was included.
3 Thus IET's panel is biased towards the larger enterprises in each sector. This is simply because its budget constraint restricts the number of enterprises that can be approached. Also, recall that DN are not included (which are usually small). 4 Thirdly, a letter of invitation, the one-page business-cycle questionnaire, the survey results of the previous month, and a pre-paid return envelope were sent to all included enterprises, as has been done since. If an answer was received, the enterprise was taken into the panel and the next mail was sent to a concrete enterprise officer. The structure of the panel is improved regularly.
Enterprises from all Russian industrial sectors are included in the panel, with the microbiological industry as the sole exception. Table 3 illustrates the coverage of the Goskomstat register and IET panel by industrial sector, using the official classification into sixteen sectors producing similar major products. 5 The bias towards the larger enterprises is clearly visible from the fact that the total enterprise share represented in the panel, which is 5.8%, is only about one fourth of the total employment share, which is 22.7%. The engineering sector is surely overrepresented, the food sector underrepresented, though the latter much less so in terms of employment than of enterprise share. Still, over the different sectors, both the enterprise and employment shares of the panel generally track those of the register rather well. Source: IET Enterprises from all over Russia are included in the panel, with the exception of some of the small republics in the South. Also, note that no enterprises are included from republics which suffered from the consequences of major and persistent security conflicts or related blockades (which are usually in the South, eg Chechen Republic). Table 4 illustrates the coverage of the Goskomstat register and IET panel by economic region. This division follows the official classification of Russia into twelve economic regions, which differ not only in their geographic locations, but also in their levels of economic development and infrastructure, the availability of natural and human resources, and their fields of specialization. Again, the panel bias towards the larger enterprises is clear. The center is surely overrepresented, though much less so in terms of employment than of enterprise share. However, even more so than over sectors, over the different regions, both the enterprise and employment shares of the panel generally track those of the register rather well. 6 More exactly: the number of enterprises in a certain sector as a percentage of the total number of enterprises covered by the register and panel respectively. 7 More exactly: the number of enterprises in a certain sector covered by the panel as a percentage of the number of enterprises in that sector covered by the register. 8 See footnote 6, substituting employment for number of enterprises. 
Questions
The main part of the arrangement made with IET consisted of the attachment of a one-page special questionnaire to its monthly business-cycle questionnaire. Thus, this survey was implemented along with the September 1999
IET business-cycle survey. Appendix B integrally shows both, translated into English, and in the original Russian version that respondents received. As part of the arrangement, besides the enterprise-level response to the special questions, IET also delivered this response to four further questions which are relevant for this paper.
Two of these come straight from its September 1999 business-cycle survey. The other two have been asked periodically since IET started surveying in March 1992. Appendix C again integrally gives both, translated into English, and in the original Russian version that respondents received. These questions allow for an investigation into the effects on enterprise restructuring in Russian industry of ownership, competition, budget constraints and institutions respectively. The period covered runs from the start of 1992 until the month of implementation of the survey, September 1999. Thus, it includes as much as possible of the period of market reforms, since the Russian state in its present form appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Questions B1 and B2 (reference henceforth being made by the letter of the Appendix, and the list number therein) ask for the cumulative change in the sales volume and the number of workers respectively. Subtracting the response to question B2 from that to question B1 gives an estimate of the change in (real) labor productivity.
Labor-productivity change is the main measure of enterprise restructuring in transition used in this paper, and generally considered to be its least problematic one (eg Linz and Krueger, 1998) . Note that the question about the sales volume asks for sales for money, thus not including barter. This is based on the idea that ultimately, to foster sustainable economic growth, it is sales for money which is needed, contrary to barter allowing for the full advantages of economic specialization. Question B4 is intended to give an alternative measure of enterprise restructuring, asking whether or not strategic perspectives (long-term viability) have (has) improved. This, to some extent, may also address the point made by Earle and Estrin (1997) , that the multidimensionality of restructuring suggests that it may be desirable to try to construct an index of overall restructuring that includes a number of separate components. On the other hand, Earle and Estrin (1998, p 14) also state that they '… believe that real labor productivity is a more reliable indicator than any measure of total factor productivity that could be estimated with Russian data'. The information obtained from IET's panel documentation allows for the classification of enterprise restructuring by sector (A2) and region (A3). Furthermore, this can be done by enterprise size too, because question C1 asks for the number of persons employed at the enterprise.
The other questions address the potential determinants of enterprise restructuring mentioned above.
Question B3 asks for the extent to which the state owns shares in these enterprises, all of which were completely state-owned before market reforms started. Thus, implicitly this question is about the extent of privatization, to enable a check for its generally hypothesized positive relationship with restructuring (eg Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995) . Note that the question concerns voting shares, because moving non-voting shares into private hands does not give the actual governance powers normally associated with privatization. This difference may matter quite a lot. Regarding non-voting shares in Russia, Earle and Estrin (1998, p 16 ) notice: 'Taking into account the existence of type A shares tends to reduce the fraction of voting shares held privately, but taking into account type B tends to raise it, so on average the two effects roughly cancel, and the private proportion differs little. Particular firms shift a great deal, however, so this could be an important factor to take into account when we consider the association between private ownership and enterprise performance'. Question C2 also gives information about ownership, since it asks for enterprise status, categorized as state enterprise, joint-stock enterprise, leased facilities, limited-liability enterprise, and other.
Question C4 makes it possible to check whether or not stronger competition leads to more restructuring, as is usually assumed (eg Dycker and Barrow, 1995) . It asks for the intensity of competition on the sales markets of the enterprise, specified into competition from enterprises in Russia, the rest of the former Soviet Union (FSU), and further foreign countries. Because, as Earle and Estrin (1998, p 18) note, for the usual (objective) concentration measures there are '… difficulties in choosing the appropriate size of the market for any given firm and of measuring the strength of actual and potential competitors in it', respondents' (subjective) evaluation of the intensity of competition may actually be a better indicator to investigate.
Question B5 intends to give an indication about the hardness of the budget constraint under which the enterprise is operating, in order to be able to test the standard hypothesis that harder constraints result in more restructuring (the classic reference being Kornai, 1980) . In most of the transition economics literature, a budget constraint is judged to be harder if less state subsidization is received (eg Earle and Estrin, 1998 , who include tax arrears). However, subsidies may effectively come from any source of finance. Besides, regarding its influence on enterprise restructuring, the hardness of the budget constraint may be better reflected by the potential subsidies expected than by the actual subsidies given. Therefore, question B5 essentially asks for this expectation: would the enterprise have been left to itself if it would have run into a real problematic situation, or would it still have been bailed out, directly by the state, or indirectly by banks, investors or any other parties?
Finally, the largest number of questions is on institutional factors, enabling a test whether better (different) institutions are indeed associated with more (a different extent of) restructuring (eg Greif and Kandel, 1995) . Questions B6 to B9 ask for the influence on the business environment of the enterprise of respectively:
federal and local laws, corruption and crime, the risk of non-payment (again, in money), and the level of trust.
The former two of these are taken as different indicators of the (quality of the) rule of law. The third can be considered a more specific aspect of the rule of law, relating to property-rights security. These three factors all focus on formal institutions. This does not go for the fourth factor, which focuses on informal institutions. Note that the level of trust more directly represents informal institutions than its capturing by the extent of associational membership (eg Narayan and Pritchett, 1996) . Thus, question B9 is more in the spirit of the World
Values Survey (eg Inglehart, 1994) . Question B10 asks which network helped the respondent most to solve the problems of his enterprise: that formed before or after the start of 1992. As the former period subsumes the Soviet era, contacts acquired in this period are taken to be largely of a 'nomenclature' nature compared to contacts acquired in the period of market reforms. Question C3 is related to B10. It asks for the number of years which the respondent is working in his (current) position. The higher this number, the more likely it seems that the respondent has his origins in the nomenclature network, particularly if it is higher than seven (in which case the respondent already held his position before market reforms began). In the spectrum from formal to informal institutions, networks can be said to take a middle position in between the extremes of laws and trust, combining enforcement aspects of both (cf Hendley, Murrell and Ryterman, 1999) .
Before using the response to the questions above for a tentative investigation of the effects on enterprise restructuring in Russian industry of ownership, competition, budget constraints, and institutions respectively, the next section first treats this response per se.
Answers
The survey answers are interesting to discuss in themselves, for they can give a feel for the extent of restructuring, privatization, competition, the hardness of budget constraints, and the quality of institutions in Russian industry respectively. However, before doing so, the coverage of IET's panel and the responding sample should be compared (as section 2 compared the coverage of Goskomstat's register and IET's panel).
The questionnaires were sent out on 27 August 1999, taking 2 to 7 days to arrive at their destinations.
Out of the 1444 enterprises in IET's September 1999 panel 1013 replied to the monthly business-cycle questions, and 945 replied to the special questions. This implies response rates of 70.2 and 65.4% respectively.
10 Table 5 shows that, over the different sectors, both the enterprise and employment shares of the responding sample nicely track those of the panel. Source: IET Over the different regions, the same message is clear from table 6. Thus, according to these tables, non-response (which is relatively low anyway) does not appear to create the problem of sample selection bias. Since (as section 2 concluded) the panel itself tracks Russian industry in general rather well, the responding sample should be of rather good quality too. Source: IET
The response on enterprise restructuring in Russian industry is in line with its well-known devastating crisis in the period covered. 11 The average cumulative decrease in sales volume in the period between the start of 1992
and September 1999 is 54%. Though still devastating, the decrease in number of workers is less, 42.6%, confirming labor hoarding in Russian industry (eg Commander, Dhar and Yemtsov, 1996) . These figures imply a decrease of labor productivity of 11.4%. The response to the question about strategic perspectives appears to show a somewhat less depressing picture. There is still 19.3% of response reporting that strategic perspectives improved. It may be that this difference is because respondents take account of their (political) lobbying power in their assessment of strategic perspectives. If so, then the response on the latter may not be interpretable as an indicator of enterprise restructuring. Still, a majority of 55.3% of response reports that strategic perspectives did not improve, and 25.5% that it is hard to assess whether they did. The latter is interesting in itself, for it illustrates the widespread uncertainty. Table 7 shows the response on enterprise restructuring by sector. Both in terms of sales and employment the engineering and light industry sectors have been hit worst. The largest decreases of labor productivity are registered in other sectors however, most notably electrical energy, which combines a sales decrease of 50.3%
with an employment increase of 3.8%. There are only two sectors which post a sales increase: medical industry (67%), and printing and publishing (92.4%). This is combined with the best productivity performances (increases of 77% and 141.4% respectively). Note that respondents in the printing and publishing sector nevertheless overwhelmingly report that strategic perspectives did not improve. This illustrates that even in enterprises performing relatively well with regards to sales and productivity, their broader situation is not necessarily perceived as such. The contrary also occurs: in the fuel industry and ferrous metals sectors more often than not respondents report that strategic perspectives improved, in spite of still performing badly with regards to sales, employment and productivity. As suggested above, this could have something to do with the fact that these two sectors, particularly the former, have relatively large lobbying power (largely based on their export-orientation, ie access to dollars), which they may have included in their assessment of strategic perspectives. in 1992 in (eg BOFIT, 1999 . 12 For proper comparison (of the same responding enterprises over the different questions), responding enterprises are the ones which answered all questions referred to in the table here. The same goes for the numbers of response mentioned in the further towns, in circumstances particularly unsuitable for commercial exploitation. In spite of a massive decrease of employment, the extent of labor hoarding (the decrease of labor productivity) in these regions is also relatively large, most likely in order to avoid even worse social disruption. 13 Labor-productivity increases are only posted in North Caucasus (16%), Kaliningrad (3.8%), and Central Black Earth (0.9%). Finally, again, there is a discrepancy between the response on sales and employment, and that on strategic perspectives. The response on restructuring is lastly ordered by enterprise size in table 9. The nine size categories used by IET were reclassified into the four categories that have become standard since used in Commander, Fan and Schaffer (1996) . 14 This gives the clearest picture. Generally, the larger the enterprises, the larger the decrease of sales, the smaller the decrease of employment, the larger the decrease of labor productivity, and the more respondents report improved strategic perspectives. The labor-productivity figures thus show that the smaller Russian enterprises are restructuring more. This is also a legacy of the plan economy, which clearly repressed smaller enterprises, and these have thus naturally done best since the start of market reforms. Furthermore, again, it may be that the larger enterprises want to avoid even worse social disruption, by keeping workers on the books, in spite of massive sales decreases. Also, they may be simply using their larger lobbying clout to generate profits without restructuring. Again, the discrepancy between the figures on labor productivity and those on strategic tables of this section. Note that this cross-sectioning of the data reduced these numbers (more enterprises answering any one question in the table). 13 Remember that the large enterprises in one-company towns are in many cases still performing the host of social functions they used to have in the plan economy, which the state has not taken over, such as providing child care and social housing. To a large extent these enterprises were and still are these towns. Thus, the social consequences of becoming unemployed here go far beyond the 'normal'. 14 That is: IET's categories 1 and 2 became 1-200 employees; 3 and 4 became 201-1000; 5,6 and 7 became 1001-10000; and 8 and 9 became >10000 respectively (see question C1).
perspectives may be taken as an indication of this: here it is even the case that the largest enterprises combine the largest decrease in labor productivity with most reporting of improved strategic perspectives. Finally, note that the general panel overrepresentation of the larger enterprises, documented in section 2, probably biases the results of this survey on enterprise restructuring downward in terms of labor-productivity change, and upward in terms of the percentage of response reporting improved strategic perspectives. The response on competition, which is available for several periods, is shown in table 11. In general, the intensity of competition is still rather weak, though up from virtually no competition at the start of market reforms. The enterprises reporting strong competition still form a minority. The response over time does indicate an increase in the intensity of competition from Russian enterprises, but there is not much of a discernible trend in the intensity of competition from foreign enterprises. In the response on the latter, the August 1998 crisis is clearly visible, however. After the crisis there has been a drop in the intensity of foreign competition, which later again recovered somewhat. This must of course be related to the devaluation of the Ruble, resulting in a large increase in the competitiveness of Russian industry (stimulating both exports and import substitution), which gradually eroded thereafter. On average, competition is mostly reported as being of intermediate intensity from the side of Russian enterprises, and as being absent from the side of foreign enterprises. The average percentage of response reporting no competition from the side of foreign enterprises from the FSU is even 40%. This may be a legacy of the strong specialization that was formed over the different FSU states in the Soviet era. Commander, Fan and Schaffer, 1996) . One reason may be that this is a subjective rather than a conventional objective measure. Subsidization may be still pervasive, but certainly in a subjective sense budget constraints must have hardened from the essentially guaranteed existence of the enterprises in the plan economy. Another reason may be that respondents do not judge the possibility of various kinds of arrears as help from the outside, in the formulation of question B5. Schaffer (1997) makes a case for viewing specifically tax arrears as a, if not the, major source of soft budget constraints. Interestingly, the response on trust suggests a relatively positive evaluation of informal institutions. It seems that the bad quality of formal institutions makes respondents more appreciative of informal institutions, although the picture of the latter is mixed. 15 Networks seem to be largely of a nomenclature nature, 100% of response reporting having benefited most from contacts formed before the start of market reforms, and reported tenures revealing that, on average, respondents were in the same position already then. Note that about a quarter of respondents reports having benefited most from contacts formed after the start of market reforms as well.
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Nevertheless, the response on networks indicates that, whatever may have changed, Russian industry is still largely ruled by 'red directors'. Source: Survey response Recapitulating, the responding sample to this survey represents Russian industry in general rather well. The response on enterprise restructuring shows that positive changes in labor productivity are very hard to find; with very few exceptions, only different extents of crisis are discernible. The response on strategic perspectives seems to show somewhat less negative restructuring figures, but they may be distorted by respondents including their lobbying power in these assessments. With respect to the potential determinants of enterprise restructuring, the survey makes it plain that massive privatization has taken place in Russian industry. On the contrary, the intensity of competition is still rather weak, particularly from the side of foreign enterprises. Unexpectedly, budget constraints come out as rather hard. Finally, regarding institutions, to some extent, a relatively positive judgement about informal substitutes for an overwhelmingly negative judgement about formal institutions, and networks seem to be still largely of a nomenclature nature.
Determinants of restructuring?
Now that the response on restructuring and its mentioned potential determinants has been discussed separately, the natural question is of course whether there are significant differences in the extent of the former depending on the status of the latter. This is the subject of table 14, giving the average response on restructuring ordered by the status of the respective potential determinants, and the P-values of the T-tests for significant differences in these averages (P of T).
17 Of course, these are only tentative results; a more general econometric analysis is left for future work.
Ownership per se turns out not to be associated with more restructuring. Privatized enterprises do show a slightly smaller decrease of sales, but this does not result in a smaller decrease of labor productivity.
Furthermore, a somewhat smaller percentage of privatized enterprises reports that strategic perspectives did not improve, mainly offset by a somewhat larger percentage reporting that it is hard to assess whether strategic perspectives improved, ie more uncertainty. However, none of the differences between SO and privatized enterprises is anywhere near the conventional statistical significance levels.
On the contrary, some of the results on competition are statistically significant. 18 In particular, stronger competition from non-FSU enterprises turns out to be associated with a significantly smaller decrease of labor productivity. For the lion's share, this is the result of a significantly smaller decrease of sales, not of more layoffs.
Unexpectedly, stronger competition from Russian enterprises goes with significantly less layoffs. The further results on competition are not significant. Nevertheless, note that the pictures emerging from the results on competition from Russian and foreign FSU enterprises are rather alike, and unlike the picture emerging from the results on competition from non-FSU enterprises. The more positive role of the latter may be a result of a higher efficiency of non-FSU compared to FSU competitors (which all come from a plan-economy background), thus exercising stronger disciplinary forces on inefficient Russian enterprises, eg to speed up the introduction of new technologies in order to remain solvent. Non-FSU competition is also a more likely source for transfer of such technologies.
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A harder budget constraint is associated with a slightly bigger decrease of sales, number of workers, and labor productivity, and a more negative assessment of strategic perspectives. As with the results on ownership, however, the status of the budget constraint does not make any statistically significant differences. On this basis, these are simply not important determinants of restructuring.
As the results on competition, the results on institutions are stronger. A better quality of laws is associated with a smaller decrease of sales, number of workers, and labor productivity, of which only the second is not statistically significant. Unlike any of the other potential determinants discussed so far, better laws seem to have beneficial effects on all counts. No one enterprise judges corruption and crime as positive, and thus P of T cannot be calculated here. However, the fact that the restructuring figures under a negative assessment of corruption and crime are in the same order of magnitude as those under a negative assessment of laws may 17 Note that, in this table, subtracting the response on the change in number of workers from the change in sales volume does not necessarily exactly match with the change in labor productivity, because each may contain different NAs (which were restricted to be the same in the tables in the previous section). Between brackets is the number of enterprises with the specified status. 18 In order to utilize the response of a maximum number of enterprises, table 14 uses the most recent observations on competition. 19 In the international macroeconomics literature, Coe and Helpman (1995) report evidence that international knowledge spillovers are important, and that trade is a mediator of these.
indicate a similarity in the negative effects of these two indicators of the (quality of the) rule of law. The same conclusion may be drawn for the more specific aspect of the rule of law, relating to property-rights security, from the fact that the restructuring figures under a negative assessment of the risk of non-payment are also in this same order of magnitude. However, regarding the risk of non-payment, there are enterprises giving a positive assessment, and the restructuring figures that go with it are not significantly better. The absence of significant restructuring differences by the status of the risk of non-payment, and its presence by the status of laws, indicates that better property-rights security is less important for enterprise restructuring than a better rule of law in general.
Moving from formal to informal institutions, enterprises with a negative assessment of trust generally show significantly worse restructuring figures than enterprises with a positive assessment of trust. As better laws, higher trust seems to have beneficial effects on all counts. With regards to their networks, the same can be said of enterprises benefiting most from newer contacts, though only significantly so in the case of the decrease of employment. Recall, however, that the previous section showed that the respondents reporting that they benefited most from newer contacts reported that they benefited most from older contacts as well. Thus, for better restructuring figures enterprises probably need both. This seems to be confirmed by the results on tenure, which are also not significant, apart from the smaller decrease of employment reported by respondents who were already in the same position before the start of market reforms. The more positive role of trust than of networks could be explained by the fact that the former offers a broader group of (potential) business partners than the latter (cf McMillan and Woodruff, 1998) . The essence is that trust can allow for transactions beyond the network, giving the possibility of more efficient transactions.
Thus, according to these tentative results, it is stronger (foreign) competition and better (formal and informal) institutions which go with more enterprise restructuring in Russian industry, while privatization and harder budget constraints do not. Admittedly, this is much less clear from the results on strategic perspectives than from the other results, but, as indicated in the previous section, the former may be distorted by respondents' reference to their lobbying power. Russia's massive privatization and harder budget constraints on their own may not have led to more restructuring precisely because of the weak intensity of competition and the bad quality of formal institutions (cf previous section). This way, the right incentives are simply still not given. The substitution, to some extent, of informal for formal institutions may have prevented even worse restructuring figures, but the results also suggest that better formal institutions in general would have improved things further (in fact, according to table 14, almost halting the decrease of labor productivity). In the end, the rule of law seems a prerequisite for Russia to benefit from the most impersonal transactions which can make a decentralized market economy thrive. institutions go with more restructuring, while privatization and harder budget constraints do not. These results may be interrelated. Stronger competition and better institutions may be necessary conditions for more restructuring, without which privatization and/or harder budget constraints cannot provide the right incentives.
The substitution, to some extent, of informal for formal institutions may have prevented even worse restructuring figures, but the results also suggest that better formal institutions in general would have led to further improvements. While trust plays a more positive role than networks, the best restructuring figures are obtained under a better quality of laws. In the end, the rule of law seems a prerequisite for Russia to benefit from the most impersonal transactions which can make a decentralized market economy thrive. Note again that these are of course only tentative results, based on simple T-tests. A more general econometric analysis is left for future work.
Nevertheless, these tentative results are informative in their description of the survey data. They suggest that, for more enterprise restructuring, Russian policies should focus more on stimulating competition and building institutions. Incidentally, this could also help the development of the de novo sector, which is the main source of rapid growth in manufacturing in the more advanced transition countries, in particular Poland (eg Johnson and Loveman, 1995) . Also note that both these reforms could do well from the political-economy perspective, so crucial in the transition countries. Firstly, according to the results, they do not go with less employment. Secondly, they may be perceived as relatively 'just'. However, at the same time, the politicaleconomy perspective also suggests that, in the current state of affairs, these reforms may be hard to implement, given that the powerful oligarchy stands to lose much from them. The danger of lock-in of this inefficient situation seems real. In the Russian case, to say the least, privatization (cum liberalization) has not created the hoped-for market pressure to fuel the development of the competition and institutions needed for proper enterprise restructuring. Dear participants of the business-cycle surveys!
The market reforms have changed a lot in our economy. The traditional statistical data reflect changes of demand, output, and prices. However, they do not give a direct answer to one of the main questions -how have the conditions of work of enterprises changed, has the economic and legal environment become more comfortable for producers. It is possible to appraise the comfort on the basis of subjective evaluations of managers of enterprises. Only they are able to summarize the influence of the vast number of formal and informal factors, which in reality have influence on the condition of enterprises. The additional questions of the September survey are devoted to this theme. 
